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CASE NOTES
Of course, it must be recognized that a decision in favor of the re-
spondent broker in this case might well have constituted an open invitation
to others to rearrange their organizational setup to skirt the provisions of
§ 2(c). It must also be realized that the § 2(a) requirement of a showing,
for a prima facie violation, that the illicit practice has had an injurious or
destructive effect on competition, together with the built-in defense of cost
justification, might seriously complicate the enforcement of the Act. How-
ever, these complications should be remedied by statutory revision, not by
strained constructions of existing statutes. Prior cases have held § 2(a) and
§ 2(c) to be independent, emphasizing that the defenses provided in the
former are not applicable to § 2(c). 14 Yet throughout the majority opinion
reference is made to discrimination among buyers, the Court stating in its
conclusion, ". . the reduction in brokerage was made to obtain this par-
ticular order and this order only and therefore was clearly discriminatory." 15
In view of the difficulties presented in a proceeding under § 2(a), the
decision would seem more readily justifiable if it provided a clear and set-
tled precedent or defined the permissible scope of corporate activity. How-
ever, as was stated at page 175, "This is not to say that every reduction in
price, coupled with a reduction in brokerage, automatically compels the
conclusion that an allowance 'in lieu' of brokerage has been granted. As the
Commission itself has made clear, whether such a reduction is tantamount
to a discriminatory payment of brokerage depends on the circumstances of
each case."
ANNE P. JONES
Sales—Effectiveness and Scope of Manufacturer's Disclaimer of War-
ranties.—Hall v. Everett Motors, Inc. 1 —An action was brought by the
purchaser of a new automobile against a retail dealer to recover for fire dam-
age caused by defective wiring. At the time of the sale the purchaser received
and accepted a bill of sale together with the manufacturer's "service policy
owner manual" containing the manufacturer's warranty which provided, inter
alia, that there were no other warranties, express or implied, made by either
the dealer or the manufacturer except the manufacturer's warranty against
defective materials and workmanship, which warranty was limited to "mak-
ing good" at its factory, within a prescribed period, parts which its exam-
ination disclosed to be defective.
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent com-
petition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, that nothing contained
in . . . this title shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differ-
ences in the cost of manufacture, sale or delivery resulting from the differing methods
or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered. . . ."
14 Federal Trade Commission v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959) ;
Oliver Bros., Inc., Biddle Purchasing Co., and Quality Bakers of America v. Federal
Trade Commission, supra note 6.
15 363 U.S. 166, 176.
I 1960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 279, 165 N.E.2d 107.
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The trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant on the count of
breach of an implied warranty of quality, and on a similar count of express
warranty, under leave reserved, entered a verdict for the defendant after the
jury had returned a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. HELD: Under the manufacturer's war-
ranty excluding other express or implied warranties by the manufacturer or
dealer, the dealer can successfully disclaim all warranties, the purchaser's
sole recourse for damage due to defects being against the non-resident manu-
facturer.
Reliance is placed on the case of Taylor v. Jacobson2 as binding the
purchaser to the total disclaimer of all warranties by the dealer. In the
Taylor case the retailer's implied warranty of merchantability running to
the purchaser was limited to, or contingent upon, the purchaser's following
the manufacturer's instructions or precautions for use printed upon the con-
tainer of the product sold. The retailer's warranty to the purchaser was
distinct from any warranty of the manufacturer, but was limited by the
printed instructions to the same extent that any implied warranty of mer-
chantability of the manufacturer, running to the retailer from the manufac-
turer, would have been similarly limited in a suit by the retailer against the
manufacturer. The conspicuity of the instructions and the purchaser's knowl-
edge of them were the essence of the Taylor decision. The limitation of the
implied warranty of merchantability adopted by the retailer and "accepted"
by the purchaser in the Taylor case should not, however, be a precedent bar-
ring the purchaser in the instant case from recovery. Rather it should fortify
the purchaser's claim. Taylor recognized the relationship between the retailer
and purchaser and did not concern itself with the contractual relationship
existing between the manufacturer and retailer. However, the court in the
instant case fails to segregate the relationships of the three parties involved.
It is not known whether there existed any express or implied warranties
running from the manufacturer to the dealer since an examination of the
sales contract of the manufacturer and the dealer was not under scrutiny.8
The warranties under examination were those flowing from the dealer to the
purchaser and from the manufacturer to the purchaser. Since the purchaser
did not rely on any warranty derivative from the dealer-manufacturer sales
contract, the question arises as to the extent to which the legal relationship
between the purchaser and manufacturer may alter the contractual relation-
ship between the dealer and the purchaser.
Manufacturers have been held liable for unmerchantable products in
direct actions by subvendees. The basis of liability generally rests on one
of three grounds: (1) The manufacturer is deemed to have entered into a
separate contract with the subvendee; 4 or (2) the manufacturer has been
2 336 Mass. 709, 147 N,E.2d 770 (1957).
3 Since the manufacturer-dealer sales contract is not under examination, the
possibility exists that all warranties were expressly disclaimed.
4 Timberland Lumber Company Consolidated v. Climax Manufacturing Company
61 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1932).
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found to have made representations through advertisements relied upon by
the subvendee, which advertisements have given rise to an action of de-
ceit; 5 or (3) the manufacturer is considered to be in sufficient privity with
the dealer-purchaser relationship to sustain a direct action by the purchaser
against him.° However, a conspicuously common characteristic of these
various approaches is that the manufacturer is not considered to be a party
to the sales contract between the purchaser and dealer although he is held
liable in a direct action by the purchaser in order to achieve the desired
economic and sociological result. Since in the instant case the bill of sale
between the purchaser and the dealer contained no disclaimer of warranties
and since the bill of sale was not accepted by the court as the integrated
contract between them, 7 it seems unsound to remove from the jury the
question of the intention of the parties to the dealer-purchaser contract with
respect to the exclusion or inclusion of any limitation of warranty similar
to that which existed between the manufacturer and the purchaser.
If the contract had been entered into under the Uniform Commercial
Code, subsequently adopted in Massachusetts, the purchaser would probably
be more successful even if the court insisted upon integrating the manufac-
turer's disclaimer of dealer warranties into the purchaser-dealer sales con-
5 Roberts v. Anheuser Busch Brewing Association, 211 Mass. 449, 98 N.E. 95 (1912).
6 At common law, the manufacturer could not be held liable for negligence in an
action by a subvendee because the manufacturer and subvendee were not considered
in privity.
The Courts have resorted to various legal fictions to put the responsibility where
they agreed it belonged:
(a) Warranty Runs with the Article. The manufacturer can be subjected to an
action by the subvendee in an action of tort (negligence). Of course the proof
of said action is facilitated by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This doctrine
has apparently been restricted to foodstuffs and dangerous instrumentalities.
Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 278, 93 P.2d 799 (1939) ; Anderson
v. Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033, 274 N.W. 48 (1937); Chenault v. Huston Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 156 Miss. 366, 118 So. 177 (1928).
(b) Warranty is Assignable. In these cases the dealer forfeits his right of action
against the manufacturer. Hunter-Wilson Distilling Company v. Forest Dis-
tilling Company, 181 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1950); 4 Williston, Contracts § 998 at
2753 (rev. ed. 1936).
(c) Ultimate Consumer is Third Party Beneficiary. Singer v. Fabelin, 24 N.Y.S.
2d 962 (N.Y. County Ct. 1941); Ward Baking Company v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio
App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
(d) Public Policy. Regardless of any legal fictions, the liability lies where it
should. Jacob Decker & Sons Incorporated v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d
829 (1942).
(e) Dealer is Agent of Manufacturer. Additional contacts are needed between
the manufacturer and purchaser to establish a direct contractual relationship
between them, distinct from the relationship between dealer and purchaser.
Timberland Lumber Company Ltd. v. Climax Manufacturing Co., 61 F.2d 391
(3d Cir. 1932).
(f) Vendee is Agent of the Consumer. This category, which has been limited
to the members of the immediate family of the vendee in the sale of foodstuffs,
brings the consumer into privity of contract with the seller and he can thus
maintain a direct action in contract against the seller. Ryan v. Progressive
Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931); Wisdom v. Morris
Hardware Co., 151 Wash. 86, 274 Pac. 1050 (1929).
7 See, Restatement, Contracts § 228 (1936).
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tract as a matter of law. Section 2-316 requires a disclaimer of an implied
warranty of merchantability to mention merchantability by name and re-
quires such a disclaimer, if in writing, to be conspicuous. Even assuming the
manufacturer's disclaimer of all warranties by the dealer satisfied the former
requirement, its conspicuity would appear to have fallen short of minimum
requirements. In addition § 2-302 provides that a court may refuse to
enforce a particular contract or clause, as a matter of law, if it is found to
be unconscionable. This section would relieve a court of the necessity of
making a pronouncement contrary to its sense of justice as the court felt
obligated to do in the instant case.
CHARLES D. FERRIS
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